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1 
The Many Encounters of Thomas Kuhn and French Epistemology 
Massimiliano SIMONS1 
The reactions provoked by Thomas Kuhn’s book, The structure 
of scientific revolutions […] would provide high-quality 
experimental material for an empirical analysis of the ideologies 
of science and their relationship with their authors’ positions in 
the scientific field. (Bourdieu, 1975: 38) 
1. Introduction 
It is an often stated fact that philosophy of science changed with  the publication of Thomas 
Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (SSR) in 1962. This book has been considered 
the start of a ‘historical turn’ in philosophy of science. Followed by authors such as Imre 
Lakatos and Paul Feyerabend, the message was  that, in order to do philosophy of science, one 
also needs to do history of science.  
 
This was the case in Anglo-American philosophy of science, but in Continental Europe the 
situation was quite different.2 Especially in France, SSR was not seen as a revolution, but 
rather as a confirmation of what was already known. As Gary Gutting states, the “French 
could hardly share the excitement of what they rightly saw as old news.” (Gutting, 2003: 46) 
Similarly, Ian Hacking claims that “Kuhn was a sensation for us, but rather old hat in France.” 
(Hacking, 2002: 93) A historical approach, indeed, is the norm in French philosophy of 
science or ‘French epistemology’.3 This is mainly due to the specific educational institutions 
in France, where history and philosophy of science were always closely linked, and students 
of philosophy were encouraged to combine the study of philosophy with that of a specific 
science (see Chimisso, 2008). Thus, authors such as Gaston Bachelard or Georges 
Canguilhem were already doing something very similar to Kuhn, namely trying to understand 
physics or biology by examining their specific historical developments.  
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In this sense, one could claim that we are witnessing a synthesis between Continental and 
Anglo-American philosophy of science. Kuhn himself, for instance, states that 
I suspect that anyone who believes that history may have deep philosophical import 
will have to learn to bridge the longstanding divide between the Continental and 
English-language philosophical traditions. (Kuhn, 1977: xv) 
More recently, Anastasios Brenner has pointed at such a unification, first of all because 
Anglo-American philosophy has become more historical. “They reject the continuism [within 
the history of science] of the logical positivists, just as Bachelard and Koyré have rejected that 
of their predecessors.” (Brenner, 2006: 115)4 Brenner speaks of a movement of ‘post-
positivism’ within analytic philosophy, which “could be seen as moving closer to historical 
epistemology.” (Brenner, 2015: 210)5 At the same time, he notices how French epistemology 
has become more analytic and logical. Authors such as Jules Vuillemin or Gilles-Gaston 
Granger actively discussed, introduced and translated the work of authors such as Bertrand 
Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein and W.V.O. Quine.6 Recent authors such as Hacking or Hans-
Jörg Rheinberger embody for Brenner this unification by actively combining both traditions. 
Brenner argues that the divergence was historically caused by a cultural barrier, referring to 
such things as language or institutions (Brenner, 2015). Both traditions, according to him, 
share the same intellectual roots in discussions around the conventionalism of authors such as 
Henri Poincaré, who influenced both French epistemology and the Vienna Circle (Brenner, 
2003). But since both sides are discovering one another, the dichotomy is disappearing. 
Rather we “may combine both methods: logically reconstructing the reasoning behind 
historical explanation, and submitting logic to historical inquiry.” (Brenner, 2015: 211)  
Nevertheless, the situation is too complex to be described merely in terms of a cultural barrier. 
By focusing on the cultural differences, one tends to overlook the argumentative differences. 
Although there are signs of both traditions coming closer together, there are clear tensions as 
well. This article illustrates this tension by mapping the specific link between the work of 
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Thomas Kuhn and French epistemology, paying particular attention to his book SSR. This  
link will be explored in both directions. The first part will briefly examine the extent to which 
Kuhn was inspired by French epistemology. It will be argued that there is a connection here, 
but not with the most famous French epistemologists, such as Bachelard or Canguilhem.  
More interesting and less explored is the influence in the opposite direction. The second part 
will therefore focus on how French epistemologists had discussed and evaluated SSR, 
focusing on authors such as Bachelard, Canguilhem, Foucault, Bourdieu and Althusser. There 
are three reasons why these reactions might be revealing. First of all, they can clarify the often 
debated and unclear position of Kuhn himself. Secondly, they give us a unique insight into the 
different approaches to philosophy of science. Finally, they can show the differences among 
French philosophers themselves. This will be done by confronting French epistemology with 
the work of more recent French authors, such as Bruno Latour and Isabelle Stengers. Based 
on these specific appreciations of SSR I will briefly suggest a typology of the different 
positions in philosophy of science. 
2. Was Kuhn inspired by French Epistemology? 
The influence of French epistemology on Kuhn has been the subject of previous studies. 
Garry Gutting, for instance, states that the “one movement in twentieth-century European 
thought that has substantive affinities with Kuhn’s work is the French tradition of philosophy 
of science.” (Gutting, 2003: 45) According to Gutting, Bachelard proposed a discontinuist 
reading of the history of science akin to Kuhn’s and, similarly, Bachelard claimed that a 
scientific revolution results in a new worldview and new scientific norms (e.g. Bachelard, 
2002). For Gutting, these authors cannot only be seen as a source of inspiration, but also as a 
possible correction of Kuhn’s problems with relativism and incommensurability. Bachelard, 
in fact, proposed a philosophy which combines discontinuity and rationality, and thus evades 
certain forms of relativism. 
Nevertheless, Kuhn himself rarely mentions Bachelard. In fact Kuhn mentions him only once, 
referring to Bachelard’s thesis study on heat (Kuhn, 1977: 219n63; Bachelard, 1927). Only in 
a few interviews did he highlight his relation to Bachelard,stating for instance that “I did read 
some Bachelard. But it was so close to my own thought that I did not feel I had to read lots 
and lots more.” (Kuhn, 1994: 160) In another, posthumous published interview, Kuhn recalls 
meeting Bachelard in Paris around 1950, an encounter that turned into a failure. With a letter 
of recommendation from Alexandre Koyré, he visited the apartment of Bachelard. “A large 
burly man in his undershirt came to the door, invited me in; I said, ‘My French is bad, may we 
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talk English?’ No, he made me talk French. Well, this all didn’t last very long.” (Kuhn, 2000: 
285)7 Although he thought that there were interesting similarities, and later read more of his 
work, Kuhn merely states that the framework of Bachelard is too constraining and too 
systematic. 
Therefore, the claim of any influence of French epistemology on Kuhn becomes problematic. 
This assertion , however, is not only based on similarities in themes and ideas, but also on 
remarks by Kuhn himself. For instance, Kuhn states that “the early models of the sort of 
history that has so influenced me and my historical colleagues is the product of a post-
Kantian European tradition which I and my philosophical colleagues continue to find 
opaque.” (Kuhn, 1977: xv)  
But what authors did he have in mind? Besides Ernst Cassirer, he mainly mentions French 
epistemologists, but not Bachelard or Canguilhem. In the preface of SSR, for example, he 
refers to Alexandre Koyré, Émile Meyerson and Hélène Metzger. “More clearly than most 
other recent scholars, this group has shown what it was like to think scientifically in a period 
when the canons of scientific thought were very different from those current today.” (Kuhn, 
1970a: vi)8 However, as the quotation above indicates, he sees these authors mainly as an 
inspiration for writing history of science, and not for their philosophical positions: 
There have been philosophers of science, usually those with a vaguely neo-Kantian 
cast, from whom historians can still learn a great deal. I do urge my students to read 
Emile Meyerson and sometimes Léon Brunschvicg. But I recommend these authors 
for what they saw in historical materials not for their philosophies, which I join most 
of my contemporaries in rejecting. (Kuhn, 1977: 11) 
Thus, the lessons for the new historiography of science did not arise from scientists nor 
historians. “Instead, they have come from philosophy, though mostly like Koyré, from 
Continental schools where the divide between history and philosophy is by no means so deep 
as in the English-speaking world.” (Ibid.: 135) Indeed, for Kuhn Koyré deserves special credit 
as “the man who, more than any other historian, has been my maître” (Ibid.: 21) and whose 
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work “provide[d] the models which historians of science increasingly aimed to emulate. More 
than any other single scholar, Koyré was responsible for the first stage of the historiographical 
revolution.” (Kuhn, 1970b: 67) 
Illuminating in this context is an encyclopedic article that Kuhn wrote about the history of 
science. Here he claims that there has been a historiographical revolution which, as stated 
above, he partly attributes to Koyré. In this article, however, he offers other reasons as well. 
First of all, he claims that historians of science have drawn lessons from the history of 
philosophy. Although he acknowledges the role of authors such as Cassirer, he states that  
partly it was learned from a small group of neo-Kantian epistemologists, particularly 
Brunschvicg and Meyerson, whose search for quasi-absolute categories of thought in 
older scientific ideas produced brilliant genetic analyses of concepts which the main 
tradition in the history of science has misunderstood or dismissed. (Kuhn, 1977: 108)  
The new approach their work implied was that, rather than seeing the work of outdated 
science as irrational or deficient, they ascribe to it a different form of rationality, based on 
different categories of thought. Again, Koyré served as the perfect example for Kuhn. 
According to Koyré, one could only fully understand the scientific work of Galileo if one 
dived into the past and the context of the author. “That task, Koyré felt, could not be done 
without immersion in an entire corpus, that of Galileo and those of his immediate 
predecessors, contemporaries, and successors.” (Kuhn, 1970b: 67) In very similar terms he 
speaks of the work of Meyerson: 
I didn’t like the philosophy at all. But, boy, did I like the sorts of things he saw in 
historical material. He went into those briefly and I mean he didn’t do it as a historian 
but he was getting it right in ways that were different from the ways that history of 
science was being written. (Kuhn, 2000: 287)9 
Secondly, he attributes great importance to the work of the French epistemologist Pierre 
Duhem, which showed that one could not ignore medieval physics to understand Galileo’s 
contributions. Finally, the failed attempts of authors such as Paul Tannery and George Sarton 
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to constitute a general history of science had shown, according to Kuhn, that it is untenable to 
attribute contemporary distinctions to the past (Kuhn, 1977: 108-109). 
However, this does not mean that Kuhn just repeated  the work of French epistemologists. As 
stated above, he was very critical of their philosophical claims. Besides that, he also disagreed 
on numerous historiographical points. Kuhn was, for instance, critical of Koyré’s “primacy of 
theoretical imagination over experience” (Kuhn, 1970b: 69). For Koyré, what was essential in 
the work of Galileo was not the experiments he did, but rather a completely new way of 
looking at the world, inspired by Platonism rather than Aristotelianism. Koyré rejected socio-
economical explanations of scientific change and the role of instruments. And although this 
might work for the case of Galileo, Kuhn thought that  “it would have been a disaster” for 
cases such as chemistry or magnetism, because it would ignore “the learned world’s new 
concern with the crafts, technology, and instrumentation.” (Ibid.) 
A range of other differences are pointed out by Brendan Lavror (2003). He states that Koyré 
starts from a stronger unity of thought: while for Koyré scientific theories are linked with 
contemporary philosophical and theological ideas, such as Platonism, for Kuhn the sciences 
are more independent of cultural history (see Kuhn, 1977: 118-119). Also, in the case of 
Koyré, just as for Bachelard or Brunschvicg, there is clear progress within the history of 
science, mainly because the history of science embodies a rational development. Kuhn, on the 
other hand, is far more reluctant to speak of progress between scientific paradigms.10 
In relation to the problem of theoretical primacy, it is interesting to refer to the French 
epistemologist Hélène Metzger (see Melhado, 1990). She was a historian of science deeply 
influenced by Meyerson and Koyré. But in contrast with them, she mainly focused on the 
emergence of new scientific disciplines, such as chemistry during the 18th and 19th centuries, 
rather than on revolutions within ‘old’ sciences such as astronomy in the 17th century (see 
Chimisso, 2001). Kuhn discovered Metzger’s work when he was in France, around the time 
he met Bachelard (Kuhn, 2000: 287). She influenced Kuhn in several ways,  including his 
claim that Stahl’s chemistry is a mature scientific paradigm, rather than a form of prescience 
(see Metzger, 1974). 
Kuhn’s critique of the theoretical primacy in Koyré seems to follow the work of Metzger, 
who focuses more on the role of institutions and techniques in the 19th century. However, 
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such a distinction is not found in the work of Kuhn. At least in SSR there is no clear 
distinction between the mechanism responsible for a revolution within a mature science 
(Koyré) and that responsible for the creation of a paradigm (Metzger) within a scientific field 
(although see Kuhn, 1976). Kuhn only focusses on mature sciences, while the process of 
maturation is hardly described. In this sense, he can be criticized for the same reason that he 
criticized Koyré: his model might work for some historical cases, but is rather problematic for 
others. 
Based on this comparison, the relation between Kuhn and French epistemology is not very 
clear, since he has great reservations about their philosophies and there are some significant 
differences. Moreover, the main French epistemologists that he discussed are not the often 
mentioned Bachelard or Canguilhem, but lesser known figures such as Koyré or Metzger. The 
relation to the better known brands of French epistemology remains unclear. However, not 
only did Kuhn refer to French epistemologists; they also referred to him. Several French 
epistemologists, indeed, reacted to the publication of SSR. These reactions can tell us 
something more about the specific similarities and differences between them. 
3. How French epistemologists read Kuhn 
SSR was published in 1962 and republished in 1970 with an important postscript; only in 
1972 was it translated into French. While it was still mainly ignored in the 1960s, it was this 
translation that sparked reactions in France. Although many of the more prominent French 
epistemologists reacted to SSR, the reaction was overall very negative. Authors such as 
Meyerson, Brunschvicg or Metzger had died several decades before its publication, but the 
tradition was still well-represented by authors such as Koyré, Bachelard, Canguilhem, 
Althusser or Foucault. It is helpful to look at what their perspective on Kuhn was.11 
Koyré  died in 1964, but apparently read the book in the final months of his life. Kuhn states 
that Koyré was very positive about the book and that he “reported from his sick-bed his 
pleasure in reading a book that seemed ‘to fill the gap between the history of science as such 
and the social history that till now were miles apart’.” (Kuhn, 1970b: 69) Only in later texts 
does Kuhn state that the book that Koyré had referred to was SSR (e.g. Kuhn, 2000: 286). 
Koyré rejected attempts to explain the progress of science through socioeconomic factors, but 
for him SSR opened the road for a reconciliation between internalist and externalist 
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Published as Simons, M. (2017). The many encounters of Thomas Kuhn and French 
epistemology. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Studies in History and 
Philosophy of Science. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2017.01.004 
 
8 
perspectives due to the intermediary notion of the paradigm. Socioeconomic elements might 
play a role in the history of science, but not as a direct influence on scientists. Rather they 
have an indirect effect through the formation of paradigms, while the development of science 
can simultaneously be a product of internal developments within the paradigm. We can infer 
this much on the basis of anecdotes that Kuhn recorded on several occasions, but the question 
remains of whether this faithfully represents Koyré’s own perspective. 
3.1.  BACHELARD AND HIS STUDENTS 
In the secondary literature parallels are often made between Bachelard and Kuhn (e.g. Danny, 
1999). The main similarity is that of a discontinuist reading of the history of science, 
respectively conceptualized as an epistemological rupture or as a series of paradigm shifts. 
Bachelard himself died in 1962 and he did not live long enough to respond to Kuhn, but 
several of his students did. Authors such as Jean Largeault, Gilles-Gaston Granger and Jean 
Ladrière were, in contrast with such parallels, rather critical of SSR. 
Largeault is very positive in his work about what he calls the ‘idealism’ of French 
epistemology, namely the idea that scientific facts are never mere brute facts, but are always 
marked by theory and rationality. However, authors such as Kuhn and Feyerabend “have 
turned this idealism into a nihilism” (Largeault, 1988: 14) due to the idea of the 
incommensurability of paradigms, which completely negates the rationality that was implied 
in this idealism. Incommensurability might be a good precaution for the individual historian 
to avoid anachronism, but it is inapplicable to scientific progress in its totality. 
“Incommensurability is valuable for individuals, but not for theories.” Rather he calls it “at 
best a provocative paradox, perhaps a farce by epistemologists.” (Largeault, 1984: 16-17)  
Largeault also states that SSR does not work for logic or mathematics, where there is no form 
of incommensurability (Largeault, 1980: 121-122). It might work for physics, and he might 
accept that facts are not independent from theory but, apart from that, Largeault could not 
believe in radical breaks between paradigms because “the problem solved by every grand 
physical theory consists of the destruction of incompatibilities (between electromagnetism 
and mechanics : RR ; between RR and Newtonian gravity: RG ; between RG and quantum 
mechanics : etc.).” (Largeault, 1984: 17n41) 
The same critique is present in the work of Granger and Ladrière. Both try to correct SSR by 
making a distinction between two forms of discontinuity. For instance, the Belgian 
philosopher Jean Ladrière, in his conclusion of a colloquium on SSR in 1973, offers some 
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criticisms of the book.12 First of all, Ladrière argues that Kuhn overgeneralizes his schemes, 
as if there is only one structure for all scientific revolutions. Ladrière makes the analogy with 
biology: although one could state that all organisms follow biological laws, there is still a 
huge difference “between a starfish and a chimpanzee.” (Ladrière, 1974: 175) Applied to the 
history of science this means that there is a difference between the structure of, for example, 
Galilean physics and quantum mechanics. 
Secondly, SRR lacks the distinction “between two sorts of crises: on the one hand crises of 
constitution on the other hand crises of restructuration.” (Ibid.) A crisis of constitution refers 
to the case which is discontinuous because one is faced with a completely new and different 
system: 
The meaning of a crisis of constitution is in fact that, through it, thought succeeds for 
the first time in a certain domain to break with the living experience [du vécu] and to 
create a conceptual system capable of operating by itself and, if we may say, on itself. 
We are dealing here with an operation of detachment with relation to that which, in a 
certain vocabulary, can be called the natural experience. (Ibid.: 176) 
On the other hand, the crisis of restructuration refers to a change due to logical problems or 
relations to other systems, both scientific and otherwise, around it. Because science in this 
case already surpassed natural or ordinary experience, there is no real discontinuity. There is 
rather a continuity of certain principles throughout these scientific changes. “One can say that 
once a science is really constituted, its development should be interpreted no longer by 
following a discontinuist scheme, but rather through a dialectical scheme.” (Ibid.: 177) 
Echoing Ladrière, Granger distinguishes between external and internal discontinuities. An 
external discontinuity refers to the shift from pre-science to science, in which “the theme of 
incommensurability has meaning” (Granger, 1993: 107). However, Kuhn also applies this to 
internal discontinuities between paradigms within science. These internal variations, which 
Granger calls subparadigms (sous-paradigmes), are “products of internal discontinuities 
posterior to the formation of a common paradigm of all the scientific thought of the same 
object.” (Ibid.) In this case there is no incommensurability, but rather a form of continuity. 
In this, both authors are clearly following Bachelard. Not only in the sense that they believe in 
scientific progress, but also when it comes to the double meaning of discontinuity. For 
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Bachelard, an epistemological rupture does not only refer to historical breaks between 
different stages of science, but also to the break between ordinary and scientific thought. 
According to Bachelard, the mind is naturally tempted by certain images, such as seeing heat 
as a hidden substance in the object (cf. Bachelard, 1927). Science can only progress by 
breaking with them. For Bachelard “it must therefore be accepted that there is a very real 
break between sensory knowledge and scientific knowledge.” (Bachelard, 2002: 237) It is this 
form of discontinuity that French epistemologists may call incommensurable, but 
discontinuities between mature scientific theories will always show some form of continuity. 
3.2. CANGUILHEM AND FOUCAULT 
Perhaps with the exception of Bachelard, the most popular parallel within secondary literature 
is that between Kuhn and Foucault (e.g. Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982). Both French and foreign 
authors, indeed, make this parallel (e.g. Piaget, 1974: 122).13 On the other hand, several 
authors have criticized these parallels stating that there are clear differences (e.g. Kusch, 
1991: 86-109). Giorgio Agamben, for example, states that “this proximity was not the effect 
of an actual affinity but the result of a certain confusion” in the early works of Foucault 
(Agamben, 2009: 14). 
Foucault himself rarely discusses the work of Kuhn and appears to have actively distanced 
himself from it.14 However, when George Steiner, in a review of Foucault, asked the French 
author why he did not refer to SSR in spite of the clear similarities between the two of them, 
Foucault responded: 
Mr. Steiner believes that I should have cited Kuhn. It is true that I hold Kuhn's work to 
be admirable and definitive. […] When I read Kuhn's book during the winter of 1963-
64 (I believe it was a year after its publication), I had just finished writing The Order 
of Things. I thus did not cite Kuhn, but quoted instead from the historian of science 
who shaped and inspired his thoughts: G. Canguilhem. (Foucault, 1971: 60) 
It is indeed only in the introduction to the English translation of The normal and the 
pathological of Canguilhem that Foucault mentions Kuhn again. Here Foucault tries to 
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14 
   The same goes for the relation the other way around. Kuhn rarely refers to Foucault, for instance only 
in a footnote (Kuhn, 2000: 14). Kuhn, however, also criticizes Foucault because he “is scarcely interested in the 
processes by which [the] system [he describes] is led to transform itself” (quoted in Delaporte, 1998: 296; see 
also Kuhn, 1994: 160-161). 
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distance Canguilhem from Kuhn by claiming that, in French epistemology, there is a certain 
normativity within the history of science 
and this norm cannot be identified with a theoretical structure or an actual paradigm 
because today’s scientific truth is only an episode of it – let us say provisionally at 
most. It is not, by depending on a ‘normal science’ in T.S. Kuhn’s sense that one can 
return to the past and validly trace its history: it is in rediscovering the ‘norm’ process, 
the actual knowledge of which is only one moment of it, without one being able, save 
for prophesying, to predict the future. (Foucault, 1989: xv) 
The claim that the history and philosophy of science requires a specific normativity is indeed 
present in the work of Canguilhem, and also in his own critique of Kuhn. For Canguilhem 
there is a clear difference between Bachelard and Kuhn, stating that “Kuhn is mistaken about 
the nature of scientific rationality as such.” (Canguilhem, 1988: 13) The ground for 
Canguilhem’s critique is the normativity towards which Foucault hints. For Canguilhem, 
Kuhn is still confused by the legacy of logical positivism and unable to “join the rationalist 
camp”. The concepts of paradigm and normal science 
presuppose intentionality and regulation, and as such they imply the possibility of a break 
with established rules and procedures. Kuhn would have them play this role without 
granting them the means to do so, for he regards them as simple cultural facts. For him, a 
paradigm is the result of a choice by its users. Normal science is defined by the practice in 
a given period of a group of specialists in a university research setting. Instead of concepts 
of philosophical critique, we are dealing with mere social psychology. (Ibid.: 13) 
In the case of Bachelard or Jean Cavaillès, in contrast, it is always a question of normed 
science, and not normal science. There is a rational regulation of scientific discontinuity that 
Kuhn is unable to conceptualize. 
However, Canguilhem is very brief in his critique and hardly refers to Kuhn in his other work. 
Instead, he attributes his critique to someone else, namely the forgotten French epistemologist 
François Russo, who similarly argues that “Kuhn […] minimizes the role of rationality in the 
progress of science. This is one of the principle weaknesses of his work.” (Russo, 1974a: 
626n13) Russo was a student of Bachelard and Canguilhem, and wrote several studies on the 
history and philosophy of science, in which he criticized Kuhn. 
Russo’s starting point is the idea that the history of science must be complemented by a 
historical epistemology. While ‘phenomenological’ history of science might focus on 
historical facts, the epistemological branch must focus on the underlying attitudes, 
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motivations and reasons of scientific progress (Russo, 1974a: 621). This epistemological point 
of view is itself inspired by Bachelard and Canguilhem, namely by the principle that one 
should start from the norms of contemporary science to evaluate how the history of science is 
still scientifically relevant for present science. Or, as Canguilhem states, “one should place 
oneself in a normative point of view if one wants to judge the efficacy of a thought.” 
(Canguilhem, 1968: 178) For Russo SSR is clearly part of the first discipline, and it therefore 
lacks an eye for the epistemological questions (Russo, 1974b: 347). 
In his work, Russo makes many of the same critiques as earlier discussed authors, such as the 
lack of a distinction between the formation of a first paradigm and a scientific revolution 
within a scientific discipline (Russo, 1983: 95). However, he also adds some new elements. 
Firstly, he makes the distinction between epistemological paradigms, which concern their 
object of study, and methodological paradigms, which concern the instruments and methods 
of science (Russo, 1974b: 355); and a related distinction between simple and complex 
paradigms, e.g. the principle of inertia versus Newtonian mechanics. Such complex 
paradigms, then, consist of a range of simple paradigms, although they are more than the sum 
of their parts (Russo, 1983: 97). 
Secondly, he criticizes SSR for not making a clear distinction between the different stages of 
a scientific revolution, namely between the negative and the positive moment. The negative 
moment refers to the abandonment of a paradigm, while the positive moment implies both the 
creation of a new paradigm and the creation of new knowledge within itself (Russo, 1974b: 
359-360). Such a distinction allows for claims such as the claim that the creation of Newton’s 
paradigm did not destroy the paradigm of Descartes, and that the two might exist next to each 
other (Russo, 1983: 99). 
Thirdly, he warns that a fixation on scientific revolutions creates a blind eye for other forms 
of knowledge production, for instance the construction of a paradigm itself. But one also 
forgets “the emergence of new horizons, outside of the scope of normal science, but of which 
the knowledge that they bring forth appear to be compatible with normal science, at least for a 
certain time.” (Russo, 1974b: 352) As examples he refers to the fields opened by microscopes, 
x-rays or radioactivity. 
Finally, he criticizes SSR for seeing paradigms as independent of each other and of their 
object. Every paradigm is for Russo always related to a specific field of phenomena, e.g. that 
of electricity, mechanics, etc. (Russo, 1974b: 352n2). Canguilhem borrows this critique when 
he warns that Bachelard’s notion of an epistemological rupture originated in a specific 
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context, namely that of mathematics and contemporary chemistry. Kuhn makes the mistake of 
extending it “to other areas of the history of science without a good deal of reflection about 
the specific nature of the area to be studied.” (Canguilhem, 1988: 14) 
Besides these corrections on SSR, Russo also claims that Kuhn lacks a theory of how existing 
knowledge gets integrated within a new paradigm. In this sense Russo is very critical towards 
the notion of incommensurability, because for him there are clear elements of continuity as 
well (Russo, 1974a: 640n33). This continuity possesses a structure that Kuhn ignores. 
“Contrary to its title, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, the work of Kuhn does not pay 
attention to the structure of new knowledge connections” between successive paradigms 
(Russo, 1974b: 362n1). As an example he gives the ‘astronomical revolution’, which implied 
a whole range of paradigm shifts that are linked together: the shift from geocentrism to 
heliocentrism, the abandonment of the idea that planets are incorruptible, the abandonment of 
circles for ellipses (Kepler), and finally the idea of general attraction (Newton). Moreover, 
there are several different forms of paradigm shifts: one paradigm might fight off the old one, 
or they may both be rejected for, or even integrated in, a third one (e.g. wave and particle 
theories). Paradigms, thus, cannot be considered as completely separate from each other, but 
are rationally and normatively linked. This normativity is, according to Russo and 
Canguilhem, impossible to grasp in Kuhn’s terminology. 
3.3. BOURDIEU AND ALTHUSSER 
As already illustrated by the case of Foucault, the influence of Bachelard and Canguilhem is 
also present in the work of various political philosophers, including Pierre Bourdieu or Louis 
Althusser. In the case of Bourdieu it is mainly within his sociology of the scientific field, in 
which Bourdieu situates himself, that Kuhn is mentioned and contrasted with French 
epistemology: : 
And I did not cease to look to Bachelard and the French tradition of epistemology, in my 
effort to found an epistemology of the social sciences on a constructivist philosophy of 
science (which anticipated Kuhn but without turning purely and simply into the relativism 
of the postmodernists), as much as in my analysis of the scientific field. (Bourdieu, 2004: 
106) 
Bourdieu thus wants to avoid any form of relativism, while defending a clear idea of progress 
and objectivity for science, by focusing on “the problem posed by the historical genesis of 
supposedly trans-historical truths” (Ibid.: 1). In this context, he sharply criticizes other 
philosophies and sociologies of science, such as SSR. He recognizes that Kuhn has introduced 
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the idea of discontinuity in the Anglo-American context as well as the notion that science is a 
collective endeavor, based on a paradigm (Ibid.: 14). Kuhn is described as a scholar who 
discovers the idea of the Kantian a priori, but in a relativized way. In this sense SSR is a book 
“whose theses contain little that is radically new, at least for readers of Bachelard, who was 
the object of similar manoeuvres at much the same time, in a different tradition.” (Bourdieu, 
1975: 46n53) 
Although Kuhn makes these analogous claims, he is still heavily criticized by Bourdieu, both 
from his Marxist and from his epistemological perspective. The ‘functionalism’ Kuhn shares 
with authors such as R.K. Merton is unacceptable for Bourdieu: Kuhn sees the scientific field 
as focused around a range of shared norms and rules, the paradigm, that scientists impose on 
themselves. The problem is that, because of this, there is no consideration for the role of 
struggle and competition, and therefore Kuhn lacks “a coherent model for exploring change” 
(Bourdieu, 2004: 15).Bourdieu's proposal is that we see the scientific field as a permanent 
struggle for field-specific capital, e.g. citations and recognition by other actors within the 
field. In this sense the scientific field is relatively autonomous from the rest of society, but not 
free from struggle: 
If we are not to fall back into the idealist philosophy which credits science with the power 
to develop in accordance with its immanent logic (as Kuhn still does when he suggests 
that ‘scientific revolutions’ occur only as a result of exhaustion of the ‘paradigms’) we 
must posit that investments are organized by reference to – conscious or unconscious – 
anticipation of the average chances of profit.” (Bourdieu, 1975: 22) 
It is this social dimension that creates a dynamic of the scientific field that eventually leads to 
objectivity. Not because of some specific norms or a priori method, but rather because the 
new actors entering the field tend to be their “most rigorous and vigorous competitors, the 
most competent and the most critical, those therefore most inclined and most able to give 
their critique full force” (Bourdieu, 2004: 54). In this sense, the objectivity of scientific truth 
is almost a mere side-effect of this internal logic. The same goes for scientific revolutions. 
Rather than following a “strictly internalist representation of change” (Ibid.: 16) as in SSR, 
Bourdieu sees revolutions as a product of actors in the field refusing to follow the existing 
cycles of recognition. Instead they create new cycles which open the path for accumulating 
new forms of symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 1975: 24). 
In the case of Bourdieu there are some clearly Marxist elements mixed in the critique 
addressed to Kuhn, but this is even more clear in the Althusserian school. Althusser was a 
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student of Bachelard, who borrowed his concept of an epistemological break and applyied it 
to Marx (Althusser, 1965). The comparison between Althusser and Kuhn is therefore often 
made in secondary literature (e.g. Smith, 1984). However, Althusser himself never discussed 
Kuhn. Students of him, such as Étienne Balibar and Dominique Lecourt, on the other hand, do 
criticize SSR extensively. 
It is interesting to note that both Balibar and Lecourt only discuss Kuhn in their texts about 
the relation between Althusser and Bachelard. Both start from the fact that several 
“commentators have seen a ‘convergence’ if not an identity pure and simple of the 
epistemological positions defended by Althusser and by Kuhn.” (Lecourt, 1975: 9 ; Balibar, 
1991: 34-35) Preceding the reflections by Brenner by 40 years, Lecourt wonders whether this 
can be read as a sign of a “postponed encounter” between “two parallel epistemological 
traditions: have they not both, from either side, reached results which coincide, at least in part, 
in their latest representatives?” For Lecourt, there are indeed some clear similarities: both 
propose discontinuist readings of the history of science, both pay attention to the role of “the 
scientific division of labour and its material instances: books, manuals, scientific instruments, 
the constitution of groups of investigators, etc.”, and both speak about the role of norms 
(Lecourt, 1975: 10). 
However, Lecourt's answer to that proposed view is firmly negative: there is no  encounter 
between Althusser and Kuhn. All the above mentioned similarities are merely superficial: a 
common discontinuist perspective is not enough, it matters what kind of discontinuity one has 
in mind to determine one’s position within the field of history of science. Or as Balibar states: 
Kuhn does only break, in appearance, with the idea of a history of progressive 
accumulation, a pure ‘quantitative’ history, to confirm it massively in the framework of 
what he calls ‘normal science’, of which he says that it is the essential object of his work 
(Balibar, 1991: 54). 
According to Balibar, Kuhn only uses his notion of discontinuity to affirm at the same time a 
conservative image of science as solving puzzles within strict rules. In a way similar to 
Ladrière, he states that SSR sticks with a fixed structure of scientific revolutions which stays 
invariant, while Althusser and Bachelard are more open to changes within the structure of this 
transition, depending on the specific context and science (Ibid.: 35). 
The second problem they address is similar to Canguilhem’s. The notion of ‘normal’ science 
seems to imply a form of normativity, which is however unclear. For Kuhn, normal science 
seems to refer to a range of shared beliefs and practices by a group of scientists who will also 
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defend them. Furthermore, Lecourt asks, to “what normativity does normal science conform?” 
(Lecourt, 1975: 16) At first sight it seems to refer to a choice made by the scientists between 
the different paradigms, but echoing the critiques made by Feyerabend or Watkins, this does 
not distinguish science from criminal gangs or theology (see Lakatos & Musgrave, 1970). The 
analogy of the Gestalt switch, which Kuhn uses in this context, is also deeply problematic 
according to Lecourt. For a Gestalt switch is not a choice, but is forced upon us, so the 
question of what drives scientific change remains unanswered. If such a switch is no analogy, 
then it is a mere image or a claim of identity. If it is an image, it should be refuted for being 
unclear, and if it is a claim that scientific change works in an identical way, then the history of 
science becomes an object for psychology. According to Lecourt, such a view would lead to a 
theory of fixed categories of the human mind. In this sense, what looked like a 
conventionalism of Kantian categories is actually some form of apriorism. “Scratch a 
conventionalist and you will find an apriorist.” (Lecourt, 1975: 18)  
We thus see that, for Lecourt, the question of scientific change remains open. And it is exactly 
around this question of scientific change that the critique of many of these French 
epistemologists centers. Similarly to Largeault, Granger and Ladrière, Balibar and Lecourt 
have a different form of discontinuity in mind, namely a rational one. For Balibar this is 
linked with the notion of irreversibility: for authors such as Bachelard, discontinuities imply a 
point of no return. For Kuhn, on the other hand, paradigms seem completely separate from 
each other, without any connection or even displaying a relation of incommensurability 
(Balibar, 1991: 56). French epistemology tries to develop a form of discontinuity or historical 
change that remains rational. Many French epistemologists subscribe to a claim by Jean 
Cavaillès in his most famous work, stating that 
one of the essential problems of the doctrine of science is that, in fact, progress itself 
may not be augmentation of volume by juxtaposition, in which the prior subsists with 
the new, but a continuous revision of contents by deepening and eradication. What 
comes after is more than what existed before, not because it contains it or even 
because it prolongs it, but because it necessarily departs from it and carries in its 
content, every time in a unique way, the mark of its superiority. There is more 
consciousness in it - and it is not the same consciousness. (Cavaillès, 1960: 78) 
This is what Largeault had in mind when he praises the ‘idealism’ of French epistemology, 
Bourdieu when he speaks of the historical genesis of trans-historical truths, or Balibar when 
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he states that his perspective goes “beyond the alternative between history and truth: it is true 
in its own history” (Balibar, 1994: 159). 
However, it is not always clear what such a rational discontinuity entails . Within French 
epistemology this is often linked with the claim that it is not the individual that is the subject 
of this rational progress, but rather the dialectics of the concept or the scientific field. For 
them the rationality within science can only be guaranteed if it lies on something that escapes 
the vagaries of the individual subject. And even if this specific paradox between history and 
rationality is not yet fully elaborated within the work of French epistemologists, “they at least 
make this ultimate paradox formulable with which the [epistemological] break confronts us.” 
(Ibid.: 161) What they understand as Kuhn’s thesis of incommensurable paradigms negates 
this paradoxical nature of science, and must therefore be dismissed. 
4. A new wave of French philosophy of science 
To grasp the difference between Kuhn and French epistemology, it is also helpful to refer to 
an article by Geof Bowker and Bruno Latour (1987) that aims to contrast French 
epistemology with sociology of science. They argue that, although both traditions start from a 
critique of positivism and empiricism, they do so on completely different grounds. Facts on 
their own can never be enough, but what must be added differs for both traditions. Starting 
from the idea of underdetermination associated with authors such as Quine and Duhem, in 
sociology of science this was seen “as a proof that we must turn to society; whereas in French 
epistemology Duhem’s argument has been taken as proof of the need to turn to theory” (Ibid.: 
722).  Societal norms, class interest or political ideologies cannot explain why certain 
scientific facts are accepted, but rather the theories that frame these facts and the normativity 
of its progress. 
According to the authors it was Koyré who “vaccinated a generation of French historians 
against social explanations of science: by making them accept the influence of philosophy and 
theology on science, he prevented infection from the influence of society.” (Ibid.: 723) 
Nevertheless, French epistemologists are not proponents of a form of Whiggish history, where 
the history of science is seen as one accumulating struggle towards more rationality and truth. 
This is shown clearly by their focus on the discontinuity in the history of science and their 
explicit criticism, as is also the case for Kuhn (e.g. Kuhn, 1970b). However, at the same time 
French epistemologists are not merely anti-Whiggish, because science is still seen as a 
rational practice, and any attempt to debunk the rationality of science is fiercely criticized by 
them. In this sense, the authors describe French epistemology as anti-anti-Whiggish, because 
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they still “seek to ensure that mere historians do not water down the radical newness of 
science.” (Bowker & Latour, 1987: 725) 
This can then be applied to the case of Kuhn: many saw similarities due to common ideas 
such as the existence of scientific ruptures or the thesis that facts can never decide by 
themselves, but need something more. French epistemologists, however, might see Kuhn not 
as part of traditional analytic philosophy of science nor as one of their own, but as part of 
sociology of science. It is indeed true that sociologists of science were the early adaptors of 
Kuhn’s work (e.g. Barnes, 1982) and that analytic philosophers criticized him for reducing 
philosophy of science to sociology and psychology (see Lakatos & Musgrave, 1970). 
Therefore his work is seen as separated from the search for the rationality of science and must 
be criticized. 
That this distinction is at stake is also shown by contrasting the reception of SSR by French 
epistemology with that of more recent French philosophers of science, who actively distance 
themselves from authors such as Bachelard or Canguilhem. One such example is mentioned 
by Bowker & Latour (1987: 730), namely that of Michel Serres. It is indeed telling that Serres 
uses Kuhn’s work in a rather positive way (e.g. Serres, 1980: 86, 138, 145). The only echo 
within his work of the earlier mentioned critiques is that Kuhn’s perspective was not so new, 
but “was rather almost contemporary to the birth of this discipline called the history of 
science”, namely in the work of Auguste Comte (Serres, 1977: 127). 
4.1.  LATOUR AND STENGERS 
Other representatives are Latour himself and Isabelle Stengers. Latour’s own view on Kuhn is 
ambiguous, in the sense that he tends to be positive and negative about Kuhn for the same 
reasons. He praises Kuhn’s concept of paradigm because it bridges the gap between the 
cognitive and the social, the explicit and the implicit aspects of science (Callon & Latour, 
1991: 18). However, when he speaks about the case of Ludwik Fleck, who he sees as a 
predecessor of his own approach, he diagnoses SSR as a relapse in all the old errors of the 
externalist point of view and as a misinterpretation of Fleck (Latour, 2002). Yet this critique 
has nothing in common with that of French epistemology. Latour’s ambiguity is rather a 
product of a similar ambiguity that he demonstrates towards sociology of science in general. 
Although he situates himself in the sociological camp, he criticizes sociology of science for 
reducing everything to the social. For Latour, external and internal explanations are two sides 
of the same coin and have to be rejected in order to open the path for a third position that 
avoids the pitfalls of both (see Latour, 1992).  
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This is also the case for Isabelle Stengers. Similarly to Serres, she is rather positive about SSR 
and uses its insights occasionally (e.g. Stengers, 1997: 109-120). Nevertheless, Stengers has 
some criticisms. For instance, she states that Kuhn sees this structure of scientific revolutions 
as something natural, rather than as a specific historical way to do science. “To describe the 
life of the sciences as a natural phenomenon is to say that there is only one choice, either to 
hamper them or to give them the means to continue.” (Stengers, 2000: 53) As authors such as 
Ladrière or Balibar already suggested, this structure of science is a contingent historical fact, 
not a necessity. But for Stengers this is not only a question of a wrong interpretation of the 
past, but also of the future. In her work with Ilya Prigogine, she states that by generalizing this 
scheme one implicitly favors one type of science over others: 
In this view the driving force behind scientific innovation is the intensely conservative 
behavior of scientific communities, which stubbornly apply to nature the same techniques, 
the same concepts, and always end up by encountering on equally stubborn resistance 
from nature. [….] Thus scientists have to deal with crises imposed upon them against their 
will. (Prigogine & Stengers, 1984: 309) 
They themselves want to stress other aspects of science. For the aim of Prigogine was to 
conceptualize a different way of doing physics yet this was not based on a specific crisis nor 
against his will. Rather “the recent history of science is also characterized by a series of 
problems that are the consequences of deliberative and lucid questions asked by scientists 
who knew that the questions had both scientific and philosophical aspects.” (Ibid.) Scientists 
are not doomed to be puzzle solving sleepwalkers within normal science. 
Stengers’ main interest in Kuhn, however, arises from the observation that many scientists 
reacted positively to SSR, while for many philosophers it was a scandal. According to 
Stengers, there are two reasons for Kuhn’s popularity among the scientists. First of all, SSR 
preserves “the autonomy of the scientific community in relation to its political and social 
environment.” (Stengers, 2000: 6) In this sense the picture is drawn that science can only 
work if one leaves the internal working of the paradigm alone, otherwise one would be killing 
the goose with the golden eggs. The second reason is that Kuhn also constructs an intrinsic 
link “between this autonomy and the impossibility of reducing the paradigm to a sociological 
or psychological reading.” (Ibid.: 49) Thus for her, contrary to the critiques of analytic 
philosophy and French epistemology,  Kuhn actually shows that a paradigm is something that 
could not be reduced to social psychology. However, at the same time, echoing this third 
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position of Latour, she contradicts the interpretation of the sociologists, since they tend to 
reduce a paradigm to social categories. 
It all depends on how one interprets the notion of a paradigm. For Stengers, but also for 
Latour (2006: 27-30), a  
paradigm, first and foremost, is of a practical order. What is transmitted is not a vision 
of the world but a way of doing, a way not only of judging phenomena, of giving them 
a theoretical signification, but also of intervening. (Stengers, 2000: 49)  
The idea is that a paradigm enables scientists to create a new type of relation with the world 
itself, which does not leave the world unchanged. Rather it intervenes within the world and 
gives it a new mode of existence, namely as a scientific fact, i.e. a fact that can be clearly 
defined and reproduced before colleagues. This is why Kuhn speaks about puzzles and why 
for Kuhn “science is not made of ideas” (Latour, 2006: 29). The creation of such a relation is 
not pre-given nor a pure psychological decision, but rather the product of an inexplicable 
‘event’, when scientist and phenomena succeed in changing their behavior in a form they can 
both agree on. 
What this implies is clear when one contrasts Kuhn’s perspective with that of Lakatos. For 
Stengers Lakatos’ perspective “inspires the idea of a gathering of facts that can be defined 
independently of the theory, so that one can then compare and negotiate between the facts and 
the theory.” (Stengers, 2000: 49) Kuhn opposes this perspective with his notion of 
incommensurability. The core of this notion, for Stengers, is not that it implies that scientists 
are chained by their paradigm to interpret the same facts in different ways. “This 
misunderstanding stems from the fact that the notion of the paradigm corresponds not to a 
new version of the ‘impregnation’ of facts by theories, but to the notion of the invention of 
facts.” (Ibid: 50) One should abandon the idea of a brute fact, and realize that the main 
definition of a fact “is not to be observable but to constitute active productions of 
observability, which requires and presuppose the paradigmatic language.” (Ibid) What Kuhn 
does in SSR is to show that the history of science is not about a search for more facts with 
which we should create a relation of knowledge. Rather, his core idea is that the relations to 
the objects have a history as well. 
5. Conclusion 
This article sketched the many encounters between French epistemology and Thomas Kuhn. 
From this it is clear that the relation between the two is far more complex than is often 
portrayed. The first part made clear that although he was inspired by French epistemology, 
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Kuhn seldom referred to its most prominent authors. Rather he took his inspiration from lesser 
known figures, such as Meyerson or Metzger. Secondly, even in relation to these authors he 
remained very critical, especially concerning their philosophical positions. 
The second, and more extensive part of this article showed that many French epistemologists 
replied to SSR in a highly critical way. Not only famous philosophers such as Foucault, 
Canguilhem or Bourdieu were examined, but also lesser known ones, such as Ladrière, Russo 
or Lecourt. In their work there was a clear consensus about Kuhn. SRR has a similarity with 
their work because it problematizes the traditional analytic philosophy of science that aims for 
an a-temporal criteria for science. However, at the same time, they fundamentally disagreed 
with what they saw as Kuhn’s alternative for this. 
This indicates that French epistemology starts from a specific view on science. Their problem 
with SSR is related to two aspects. Firstly, the idea of discontinuity and incommensurability. 
Many French epistemologists rejected the incommensurability thesis, at least for 
discontinuities within mature science, while accepting it for the discontinuity between 
ordinary and scientific knowledge. Secondly, they disagreed on the element of normativity 
and rationality. In this sense, they came close to authors such as Popper or Lakatos. 
Nevertheless there is a crucial difference. Rather than stating that there is an a-temporal norm 
for sciencificity, for French epistemology the rationality and normativity of science lies within 
its historical process. This is the central paradox of many of their reflections, namely how to 
combine a science that is both rational and has a history and thus novelty. 
French epistemologists associated Kuhn with a third position, namely that of a sociological 
approach or what can be called social constructivism. Such a reading is itself problematized 
by a new generation of French philosophers of science, such as Latour or Stengers. They are 
far more positive about Kuhn, but mainly by claiming that his work can be seen as something 
that is neither the position of traditional analytic philosophy of science, nor French 
epistemology, nor social constructivism. They develop another perspective, which can be 
called ‘French neoconstructivism’. This perspective draws its lessons from social 
constructivism, but also actively distances itself from it. Although paradigms are related to 
socioeconomic factors, they cannot be reduced to them or must at least be understood in a 
completely different way. In this sense it sees itself as a correction of social constructivism 
and it mobilizes Kuhn for this purpose. He is praised to the extent that he transcended the 
other positions, but criticized for elements that still come close to it. 
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However,  Kuhn's position in this story is very unclear and he seems to be the victim of 
several approaches trying to mobilize or criticize him for their own gain. Often this problem is 
framed as the choice between him being either a follower of analytic philosophy, similar to 
Lakatos or Larry Laudan, or part of a more social constructivist program (e.g. Zammito, 
2004).  Taking this French tradition into account, however, adds a new dimension to this 
discussion. Kuhn’s work can, in fact, be used to distill the typology of the different positions 
sketched above: analytic philosophy of science, French epistemology, social constructivism 
and French neoconstructivism. In which category Kuhn falls is unclear: the first two positions 
tend to distance themselves from his work, while the latter two tend to recruit him. In the 
context of this article, this leads to two final reflections. One the one hand we can ask to what 
extent Kuhn is really marked by a sociological approach, as seems to follow from the 
perspective of Bowker & Latour (1987). Can he really be recruited for social constructivism 
or is there rather a fundamental affinity to French philosophy of science? If so, this opens to 
path for Kuhn’s SSR being part of a third path, neither seeking for absolute, a-temporal 
rationalist criteria nor giving a purely sociological account of science. And secondly, if Kuhn 
was born in France, would his terminology or his claims have been different? Is he really an 
adversary for French epistemology or rather a misunderstood friend? 
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